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Does a Mature Minor Have a Right to
Participate in Health Care Decisions?
Cara D. Watts*
After removing a tumor from the soft tissue of his mouth, doctors
diagnosed 12-year-old Parker Jensen with an extremely rare and
aggressive cancer, Ewing's sarcoma. 1 Parker's parents were unsure of the
proper course of treatment for their son and wanted to secure a second
opinion.2 However, physicians filed for a court order to remove Parker
from his family and immediately begin a harsh regimen offorty-nine weeks
of chemotherapy.3 As Parker's parents battled the State of Utah amidst a
confusing, volatile sea of physicians' diagnoses, recommended therapies,
court orders and kidnapping and child neglect charges, Parker's voice was
completely drowned out.4 Should Parker be adrift from the proceedings, or
should his opinion play a vital role in determining his health care?
I. INTRODUCTION
The family unit, which encompasses a diverse and vast array of human
relationships, forms the very core of society. Each small family shoulders
the immense responsibility of creating and rearing the next generation and
* B.A. 2000, University of Nevada, Las Vegas; J.D. 2005, University of California,
Hastings College of the Law. While at Hastings, I participated in the Family Law
Concentration and in the Public Interest Clearinghouse program, graduating with a Public
Interest Law Certificate. I am very grateful to Professor Lois Weithorn for her guidance,
encouragement, and wealth of knowledge on this subject. I would also like to thank the
editorial board and staff of the Hastings Women's Law Journal for selecting and editing this
Note.
1. Paul Foy, Parents Still Face Legal Fight to Stop Son's Chemotherapy, Hous.
CHRON., Oct. 13, 2003, at 6, also available at
http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=423224651 &sid=2&Fmt=-3&clientld=3266&RQT=30
9&VName=PQD (last visited April 8, 2005).
2. Paul Foy, Fugitive Father Defends Fight Against Treatment, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 1,
2003, at 8, also available at http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=391229261&sid=2&
Fmt=-3&clientld=3266&RQT=309&VName=PQD (last visited April 8, 2005).
3. Id.
4. Id.
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imparting to it both the family's unique values and society's norms and
regulations. In order to be successful in this endeavor, courts have
recognized that the family must be protected by a broad right of privacy
that strictly limits government interference in the intimate workings of a
family .
5
This right of privacy grants a family wide discretion to make its own
decisions and determine its own course of direction.6 It stems from a legal
trend known as the "constitutionalization" of the family which began in the
1960's when the United States Supreme Court considered state restrictions
on marriage, and access to contraception within marriage, in the landmark
cases of Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967), and Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).7 In these cases, the Court extended the
definition of liberties protected by the Fourteenth Amendment to include a
right to marry, a right to marital privacy and a "right to establish a home
and bring up children."
8
Since the advent of these cases, many more state regulations of the
family have been subjected to constitutional scrutiny.9 Although the state
continues to regulate some of the most fundamental aspects of a family,
including marriage, divorce, adoption, foster care and child neglect, many
modem family issues implicate constitutional liberties and the right to
privacy.' 0 Often, state regulations conflict with parents' wishes for their
children and an impassioned struggle ensues over whether the state or the
parent will control such vital aspects of a child's upbringing as education,
custody and medical treatment." The most intense struggles arise when
there is a disagreement between a parent's medical wishes and the state's
determination of the best interests of the child.' 2 Occasionally, parents and
5. Elizabeth J. Sher, Note, Choosing for Children: Adjudicating Medical Care
Disputes Between Parents and the State, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 157, 157 (1983) (explaining
that "[j]udicial recognition of privacy interests in recent years has produced a corollary that
government intervention into family matters should be severely restricted.").
6. See generally Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (holding that a
state statute may not require parents to send children to a public, as opposed to private,
school); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (invalidating a law that prohibited
teaching German to young students).
7. Walter Wadlington, David C. Baum Memorial Lecture: Medical Decision Making
for and by Children: Tensions Between Parent, State, and Child, 1994 U. ILL. L. REv. 311,
312 (1994).
8. Id. at 313 (quoting Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399).
9. Id. at 312-13 (documenting that "[o]nly after these cases did a sizeable body of
litigation seeking to apply the Fourteenth Amendment to allegedly arbitrary state regulation
in the domestic relations sphere begin to accumulate").
10. Sher, supra note 5, at 157.
11. Wadlington, supra note 7, at 311 (stating that "[t]he conflict between parental
desire to maintain control over the upbringing of their children and the government's
interest in ensuring that various aspects of children's lives are not subject to unfettered
discretion and parental whim arises frequently within the context of education, religion, or
any other of a broad host of social issues.").
12. Id.
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the state disagree about the type, length and necessity of medical treatments
for a child. In these cases, who, if anyone, possesses the ultimate right and
responsibility to make a child's medical decisions? 13 If a parent refuses
medical treatment for a child, the state may intervene and adjudicate the
case under child abuse and neglect laws if a court determines the child
should receive medical care.14 A court may, and does, "give legal, and, if
necessary, physical custody [of a child] to [a] state agency for as long as
necessary to administer the approved medical care."' 15
Currently, there is no national consensus as to how much deference
should be given to parental health care decisions.' 6 As a result, there are
extreme cases of both too much and too little deference accorded to a
parent's wishes, while the health and well being of a child hangs in the
balance.' 7 Many argue that in the fight between parents and the state, a
minor possesses an interest in participating in medical decisions that so
fundamentally and intrusively affect his or her life.'
8
If a minor voices an opinion in the medical decision-making process,
when should that voice be determinative, or at the very least persuasive, in
the parent-state conflict? An analysis of a minor's right to participate in
health care decisions is necessary given the huge variations from
jurisdiction to jurisdiction over the amount, if any, of deference given to a
minor to consent to or refuse medical treatment.' 9 This Note proposes that
a child's interest in determining his or her own health care is an essential
factor that must be considered in the struggle between parents and the state.
In the event of a conflict between parents and the state over a minor's
health care, this Note argues that not only does the court have a moral
obligation to consider a minor's decision, but a mature minor has a valid
liberty interest under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
of the United States Constitution to participate in health care decisions.
13. Sher, supra note 5, at 157 (arguing that "[u]nlike privacy decisions that a parent
makes about his or her own life, parental decisions about medical care for a child concern
choices about another's life that can have an irreversible effect on the child's future").
14. Id. at 158.
15. Id.
16. See id. at 159.
17. See generally id. at 163-64 (highlighting the distinctions between various
jurisdictions, such as New York and California).
18. See generally Sharon Elizabeth Rush, The Warren and Burger Courts on State,
Parent, and Child Conflict Resolution: A Comparative Analysis and Proposed Methodology,
36 HASTINGS L.J. 461, 495 (1985) (reasoning that "a recognition that [a] child has some
rights and a willingness to define those rights are necessary to protect the child from
unreasonable state regulations. If children's rights are taken seriously, then a child who
suffers from unreasonable state regulation of a fundamental right would be entitled to
challenge the state whether or not the parent approved*').
19. See Sher, supra note 5, at 163-64 (pointing out that in cases of conflict over a
child's medical treatment, New York alone has "run the gamut from refusing to intervene
unless a life-or-death question was involved to permitting intervention whenever it would
have a beneficial effect on the child regardless of the parental objection.").
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After comparing and contrasting different approaches of incorporating a
minor's wishes, this Note proposes that a court should employ a tripartite
test to determine when a minor may be instrumental in the health care
decision-making process.
A tripartite test is useful and thorough as it considers 1) the treatment's
effectiveness, 2) a child's chances of survival with or without treatment and
3) the emotional and physical side effects of the treatment on the child.
This Note recommends that a fourth prong be added to the tripartite test to
allow the court to consider the child's preference for or against medical
care. Under this fourth prong a court should consider a minor's
competence to actually seek or refuse treatment. This test will be applied
to three cases involving controversies over a child's health care to
demonstrate possible outcomes in a variety of situations, and to highlight
the importance of a minor's role in medical decisions.
II. PARENTAL AUTONOMY
Parental autonomy embodies the idea that a parent exercises enormous
control over a child and is recognized by the state as the primary decision
maker in all aspects of a child's life.20 Traditionally, the jurisprudence of
this country has reflected this broad, overreaching view of parental
autonomy.21 In Parham v. JR., the Supreme Court firmly established that
"our constitutional system long ago rejected any notion that a child is 'the
mere creature of the State' and, on the contrary, asserted that parents
generally 'have the right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and
prepare [their children] for additional obligations.',,
22
Over time, the Supreme Court has articulated several justifications for
parental autonomy. According to the Court, parental autonomy rests on
the presumption that a parent is needed to make most decisions for a child
because children simply lack the requisite maturity, experience and
capacity to adequately make appropriate decisions.24 The Court favors
parental autonomy because of the idea that the "natural bonds of affection"
between parent and child will "lead parents to act in the best interests of
their children.,
25
In essence, the Court has justified granting parents nearly absolute
parental autonomy on the assumption that children do not possess the
experience and perspective to make informed, critical decisions, nor do
they possess the "judgment to recognize and avoid choices that could be
20. See Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979).
21. Id. at 602.
22. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Pierce, 268 U.S. at 535).
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. See Parham, 442 U.S. at 584.
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detrimental. ' '26 Hand in hand with the idea that children are incompetent to
reach a valid decision is the assumption that a parent has the capacity to
choose the best course of action and will do so out of a desire to love,
protect and nurture a child.27
As such, the Court has gladly given parents the guiding role in a child's
life, and the state continues to use parents to protect children from making
28bad decisions. Both the Supreme Court and the state recognize and
respect parental autonomy in an effort to reinforce the parental role, and in
response to the "peculiar vulnerability of children."
29
In his concurring opinion in Parham, Justice Stewart upheld parental
autonomy, or a parent's right to decide, as absolute and as the primary
consideration for the judiciary in determining a child's welfare.30
Specifically, Justice Stewart stated that "[f]or centuries it has been a canon
of the common law that parents speak for their minor children. So deeply
embedded in our traditions is this principle of law that the Constitution
itself may compel a state to respect it."'31 Historically, "the tradition of
legal protection of parental rights has deep... roots ... [and] [b]efore the
twentieth century, the combined status of biological parenthood and
marriage signified a legal authority of almost limitless scope.",32  The
Supreme Court has drawn on the common law, and more recently the basic
tenets of the Constitution, to formulate the legal idea that a person's
parental rights are unquestioned.33 In the last several decades, however, the
Court began to chip away at absolute parental autonomy, limiting it in a
34
variety of ways to bring it more in harmony with the interests of minors.
Although the Supreme Court has continuously recognized a parent's
fundamental right to the care, control and custody of a child, that right has
been tempered by the idea that parental autonomy is not without some
limitations.35 A particularly contentious area of limiting parental autonomy
appears in health care decisions. In general, there are no clear and
consistent guidelines for the judiciary in deferring to or imposing parental
autonomy, and the possibility of a limited exception to parental autonomy
in the area of minors' health care is especially murky.
3 6
26. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 635 (1979).
27. Id. at 637-38.
28. Id. at 638.
29. Id. at 634.
30. 442 U.S. at 621 (Stewart, J., concurring).
31. Id.
32. Elizabeth S. Scott & Robert E. Scott, Parents as Fiduciaries, 81 VA. L. REV.
2401, 2406-07 (1995).
33. Id. at 2407.
34. See generally Rush, supra note 18.
35. Id. at 463 (explaining that several key decisions gave the parent-child
relationship constitutional protection but that "the constitutional right of the parent to
control the upbringing of the child is not absolute.").
36. Id. at 483 (highlighting that "[c]learly missing from the Supreme Court's
Summer 20051 ASKING ADOLESCENTS
HASTINGS WOMEN'S LAW JOURNAL
In the context of choosing health care for children, "[c]ourt decisions
reflect a variety of approaches to state intervention in parental medical
decision making."37 Jurisdictions vary in the deference, or lack thereof,
given to parental autonomy over a child's health care, and "courts have
proffered a wide range of often conflicting rationales and less-than-
thorough analyses of the relevant interests and elements arguably critical to
such a decision. ' '38 Overall, a fierce and unyielding philosophy of absolute
parental autonomy remains closely intertwined with judicial resolutions of
the parent-state conflict.39
In fact, the only consistent element in the judiciary's balance
between parent and state interests in children's health care is the
importance each court places on the notion of parental autonomy and its
attempt to accommodate or override it.40 As such, most of the disputes
over minors' medical care involve a perceived affront on parental
autonomy by state interference.41 Several cases clearly demonstrate the
prominent role parental autonomy plays in medical decision-making for
minors.
A. PARENTAL AUTONOMY IN CONFLICT WITH THE STATE AND MINORS
Most recently, the case of Parker Jensen illustrates the heart-breaking
struggles between parental autonomy and the state.42 Facing felony
kidnapping charges after fleeing with their son to shield him from court
ordered chemotherapy, Parker's parents angrily declared, "[t]hey have
taken away our rights as parents. It's our decision as to treatment.
4 3
Parker's father stated that "[a]ny parent with concern for a child would
want to know definitely what he has before doing something as invasive as
forty-nine weeks of chemotherapy," 44 and both parents desperately argued
that Parker was currently healthy and the chemotherapy could just as easily
kill him.45 After an enraged and sympathetic public rallied to defend the
Jensen's decision to seek other medical opinions and explore their options,
the Utah court finally dropped the child neglect case and did not enforce
attempts to resolve conflicts among the state, parent, and child are consistent judicial
standards.").
37. Sher, supra note 5, at 159.
38. Id.
39. Ann MacLean Massie, Withdrawal of Treatment for Minors in a Persistent
Vegetative State: Parents Should Decide, 35 ARIZ. L. REV. 173, 186 (1993) (recognizing
that parental autonomy over the upbringing of children is vital and has roots in both the
Constitution and common law).
40. See generally Sher, supra note 5.
41. Wadlington, supra note 7, at 311 (explaining that the "conflict between parental
autonomy and governmental protection of children does not promise to be easily
resolved.").
42. Foy, supra note 2, at 8.
43. Id.
44. Id.




Two cases in the past also illustrate the conflict between parental
autonomy, the state and a minor's interests. In the first case, Patricia
Hudson was born August 8, 1930, with an abnormal left arm that was much
larger and heavier than the right arm and that hung limp.4 7 In fact, the size
of the left arm caused a variety of serious health problems, including
straining Patricia's heart and causing deformities of Patricia's chest and
spine from carrying the enormous weight.4a Patricia's adult sister and other
siblings sought the court's intervention after their parents refused to allow
12-year-old Patricia to undergo an operation that would remove the arm.49
Patricia "had many times expressed the wish for removal of the left arm
and frequently wept because of her affliction., 50 Patricia's mother argued
vehemently "that there is neither [a] constitutional nor inherent right in
[the] ... court to subject her minor child, over her objection, to a surgical
operation.",51 Despite her mother's argument, the court ordered Patricia's
arm to be amputated. 52 In this case, how much consideration should the
court have given to parental autonomy, and how much consideration should
have been given to Patricia's wishes?
In the early 1970s a New York court ordered surgery for 15-year-old
Kevin Sampson. Kevin suffered from neurofibromatosis, or "elephant
man" disease, which had caused a horrific facial disfigurement consisting
of a "bag-like" growth that had caused the right side of his face to be twice
the size of the left.53 The effects of the disfigurement on Kevin's education
and social development were severe.54 Kevin left school at a young age to
escape the cruel teasing he endured from his classmates, and he was
withdrawn and functionally illiterate.55
The court documented evidence that Kevin wanted the surgery.56 After
considering the gravity of Kevin's deformity and situation, the court
ordered the risky procedure, against the wishes of Kevin's mother, in order
to promote Kevin's development and increase his chances for a "normal,
useful life.",57 In this context, it is difficult to know how much weight the
court gave Kevin's desire for the surgery when making its decision to
subject him to an operation that was necessary, but dangerous.
46. Paul Foy, Utah Drops Parental-Neglect Case, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Oct. 25,
2003, at A8.
47. In re Hudson, 126 P.2d 765, 767 (Wash. 1942).
48. Id. at 768.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 769.
52. Id.
53. Wadlington, supra note 7, at 319.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. In re Sampson, 317 N.Y.S.2d 641, 644 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1970).
57. Id. at 687.
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For many, the idea of parental autonomy is an emotionally entangled
issue, particularly with regards to parents' control over the medical
treatments of their children. Often, people vehemently object to minors
making decisions beyond the authority and desires of their parents. One
newspaper editorial questioned "just how much leeway [can] ... a parent
give a minor child to make a dumb-deadly decision.' 58  The editorial
argued that allowing minors to make such a decision is akin to allowing
children to play ball in a busy street, to play with matches, or to play with a
loaded gun.
59
On the other hand, in another letter to an editor of a local newspaper in
Florida, a woman commented that "[p]arents, like doctors, and government
officials, will from time to time make mistakes, but it is far safer to trust
loving parents than unrelated bureaucrats who have frequently proved
themselves unable to apply common sense in family situations., 60 The
cases of Parker, Patricia and Kevin, as well as these editorials, highlight the
constant tension between parental autonomy, state interests and a child's
interests in medical treatment decisions.
Predicting when, and in what situations, the judiciary will defer to
parental autonomy is extremely difficult. 61 There are, however, a number
of exceptions, or limitations, to parental autonomy, both in and out of the
health care context, which upon closer examination may reveal a pattern
where a minor's autonomy is given some weight.62 This pattern may prove
useful in determining when, as in the above three cases, for example, a
minor may choose his or her own health care above and beyond a state's
63interests or a parent's voice.
B. A CHECKERBOARD OF EXCEPTIONS TO PARENTAL AUTONOMY
Although it may seem that parental autonomy is boundless, exceptions
to a parent's right to decide have hemmed in the reach of parental
autonomy in a number of important areas. 64 Many scholars argue that an
absolute parental autonomy may no longer be appropriate in certain
circumstances, as the era in which the concept developed is no longer
reflective of the modem society in which it is applied.65 For example,
when Blackstone articulated the theory of natural bonds of affection that
guide parents in making decisions for their children, the law at that time
58. Patricia G. Miller, Parents Hold Major Role in Minor's Decisions, PITTSBuRGH
POST-GAZETTE, Apr. 20, 2000, at B2.
59. Id.
60. Linda Wightman, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Oct. 5, 2003, at G2.
61. Wadlington, supra note 7, at 311 (discussing the "often contradictory
responses... of courts to parental refusal of medical treatment for their children.").
62. See Rush, supra note 18.
63. See generally id.
64. See Wadlington, supra note 7.
65. Wadlington, supra note 7, at 332.
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granted the father almost sole parental rights and children were often
valued in society as pure economic potential, or as people who would be
required to perform housework, farm work or work in the family business,
beginning at a very young age.66 Certainly, eighteenth century English
common law, upon which Blackstone drew heavily, was harsh towards
children.67 As such, there is a persuasive argument to reshape the view of
parental autonomy and its role into a more modem approach in which
parental autonomy is limited by exceptions that account for today's
radically different conception of children and the family.68
Shifting the approach to parental autonomy requires creating a new
legal framework that analyzes and incorporates children's, as well as
parents', rights and interests.69  The Supreme Court began this gradual
change towards valuing a child's rights and interests in the late 1960s
during the Warren Court.70 The Warren Court addressed a group of cases
that questioned the state's position on 1) due process in a juvenile
delinquency hearing, and 2) a child's First Amendment right to freedom of
expression.71 In these cases, the Court established a precedent for
respecting children and granted them constitutional protection by
"requiring the application of recognized values and standards, regardless of
the age of the party involved.,
72
More and more, critics reject absolute parental autonomy and embrace
instead a "child-centered perspective" that traces its beginnings back to the
Warren Court's ground breaking decisions to recognize a minor's
constitutional right to freedom of expression and due process. 73 In general,
there is an increasing dissatisfaction with the idea of the traditional,
66. Scott & Scott, supra note 32, at 2406-07 (explaining that "the combined status of
biological parenthood and marriage signified a legal authority of almost limitless scope....
Parents, particularly fathers as heads of household, had extensive legal authority over the
lives of their children. Parental rights were understood to be grounded in natural law and
were not dependent on behavior that promoted the child's interest.").
67. Id. (highlighting the fact that "[p]arents' interest under traditional law was
property-like in many respects. A parent's right to the custody of his children so
approximated property ownership that it could be transferred by contract, and lost only by
abandonment or unfitness.").
68. Wadlington, supra note 7, at 332.
69. Scott & Scott, supra note 32, at 2401.
70. See Rush, supra note 18.
71. Id. at 464-70. See generally Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist. 393
U.S. 503 (1969); Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1
(1967).
72. Rush, supra note 18, at 492.
73. Scott & Scott, supra note 32, at 2401 (criticizing "the traditional focus on
parents' rights as impeding the goal of promoting children's welfare" and arguing for "a
'child-centered perspective,' in contrast to the current regime under which biological parents
continue to have important legal interests in their relationship with their children") (quoting
Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Hatching the Egg: A Child-Centered Perspective on Parents'
Rights, 14 CARDozo L. REv. 1747 (1993)).
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supposed "rights" of parents.74 Many argue that parental autonomy should
no longer be viewed in terms of a "right" that parents possess over their
children as it emphasizes a parent's self-interest over the child's interest. 75
In order to make the transition to a child-centered legal system, some legal
scholars suggest transforming parental autonomy into a fiduciary duty
rather than an "inherent right derived from [biological] status. 76
Several new policies suggest that the legal system is embracing a
transformation from an absolute parental right to a system in which a
parent is viewed as a fiduciary who guards a child's, as opposed to his or
her own, interests.77 "Through these developments, lawmakers seem ready
to intrude upon parental autonomy to a greater extent than was allowed by
traditional law.",78  Treating parents as "fiduciaries entrusted with their
children's welfare" constitutes a flexible approach to parent-child-state
conflicts that allows a court to acknowledge children's interests.
79
Beyond the fiduciary view of parental autonomy is the argument that
children simply do enjoy some constitutional protections that supercede
any "right" invested in the parent.80 The Supreme Court clearly asserted
that "[a] child, merely on account of his minority, is not beyond the
protection of the Constitution." 81 The Court has, then, discovered some
exceptions to parental autonomy in the Constitution itself.82 In essence,
under both a fiduciary view, in which a child's interests are the focal point,
and a constitutional analysis, in which constitutional protections are
extended to children, the Supreme Court and other courts throughout the
country have carved out a number of exceptions to parental autonomy and
have recognized a minor's autonomy and "constitutional protection from
unreasonable state regulation.,
83
1. Minors' Inherent Constitutional Rights Limiting State Autonomy
The Supreme Court recognized that a child has a right to due process
and procedural safeguards in the juvenile justice system when it decided In
re Gault.84 In this case, a 15-year-old was charged with making obscene
74. Id. at 2473.
75. Id. at 2413.
76. Id. at 2401.
77. Elizabeth S. Scott, Parental Autonomy and Children's Welfare, 11 WM. & MARY
BILL RTs. J. 1071, 1081 (2003) (positing that "[t]he fiduciary model recognizes the need to
minimize regulatory burdens on the parent-child relationship, the importance of respect and
autonomy to parental role satisfaction, and the reciprocal relationship between role
satisfaction and fulfillment of responsibility.").
78. Id. at 1071-72.
79. Id. at 1072.
80. Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 632.
81. Id. at 633.
82. Id.
83. Rush, supra note 18, at 470.
84. See 387 U.S. 1, 33-57 (1967).
[Vol. 16:2
ASKING ADOLESCENTS
phone calls and sentenced to six years in a state industrial school. The
process of the minor's arrest and conviction was patently unfair and
offensive to the protections of the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process
Clause as the minor's parents were not informed of the arrest, nor was the
minor included in the initial proceedings.8 6
The Court concluded that the juvenile justice system should be saddled
with the dual responsibility of protecting a child and upholding his or her
due process rights.87 Although the Court accepted the philosophy that the
juvenile justice system should treat a child differently than the harsh adult
criminal system would, it did not advocate carrying that differential
treatment so far as to erase a minor's due process rights.8 Rather, in In re
Gault, the Court for the first time recognizes a minor's autonomy and
entitlement to due process and paves the way for due process rights to be
extended to children in other contexts.89
Additionally, the Court extended the right of freedom of expression to
minors. 90 In Tinker, five minors were suspended for wearing black
armbands to protest the Vietnam War.91 The Court held that the students'
expulsion was unconstitutional as it interfered with their right to freedom of
speech.92 The Court recognized a state's interest in controlling schools, but
it would not let that interest trample a student's right to freedom of
speech.93 The Court found that "students are protected by the Constitution
even within the special environment of school. 94 The due process and
freedom of speech rights granted by the Court are not dependent on age or
context, but rather represent inherent individual liberties guaranteed to both
children and adults under the Constitution.95 As stated in Parham,
"[c]onstitutional rights do not mature and come into being magically only
when one attains the state-defined age of majority. Minors, as well as




87. Id. (explaining that the juvenile justice system should act not as a prosecutor, but
rather as a parent correcting a confused child, and demanding that the system afford each
child "certain basic procedural safeguards granted to adults.").
88. See Gault, 387 U.S. at 33-57.
89. Rush, supra note 18, at 466-67 (demonstrating that "the Court emphasized the
importance of due process to 'individual freedom,"' and highlighting the Court's
recognition that in the juvenile justice system in particular, "when children are afforded due
process, the case is often dismissed for lack of proof, and some children who are transferred
to the adult system for trial may be harmed by the lack of procedural safeguards.").
90. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist. 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969).
91. Id. at 508.
92. Id. at 514.
93. Rush, supra note 18, at 469.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. 442 U.S. 584, 627 (1979) (Brennan J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
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These cases demonstrate that children have rights against the state
when the child's and the parents' interests are aligned. Although the cases
do not specifically address the interests of a minor in the face of parental
autonomy, they clearly establish that minors possess some constitutional
rights that serve to limit state autonomy. It may be logically argued,
therefore, that these rights can be applied to the medical decision-making
context to allow minors to assert their interests whether they are acting in
concert with their parents or not.
2. Exceptions to Parental Autonomy Based on Context
Beyond child abuse and neglect, which constitute the most fundamental
grounds for terminating parental autonomy and placing a child under the
parens patriae power of the state, the first basic exception to parental
autonomy is legal emancipation. 97 The definition of a legally emancipated
teenager is one who is "not living at home and is self-supporting, is
responsible for himself economically and otherwise, and whose parents
(voluntarily or involuntarily) have surrendered their parental duties and
rights."98 Under common law emancipation, a married minor or a minor in
the armed forces is deemed to be emancipated on the grounds that the
minor's life is no longer compatible with parental autonomy.99
To become emancipated under a general emancipation statute, a minor
petitions a court "to be relieved of the disabilities of minority. °100 The
court will analyze the best interests of the minor and the minor's
competence to assume the responsibilities of normal adult life.' °1 If a court
grants emancipation, a minor assumes all of the rights and responsibilities
associated with adulthood, including the right to consent to or refuse
medical care.1
0 2
Emancipation laws recognize that a minor's life may be so independent
of the parents as to "warrant a transfer of decision-making authority."'
0 3
Emancipation embodies the idea that a minor may be independent and
sufficiently competent to make adequate life decisions apart from the
desires or influence of his or her parents.' 4 "By shifting decisional
authority from parents to minors, the law of emancipation directly
challenges the assumptions that parents are always the preferred decision-
(quoting Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976)).
97. J. Shoshanna Ehrlich, Grounded in the Reality of Their Lives: Listening to Teens
who Make the Abortion Decision Without Involving Their Parents, 18 BERKELEY WOMEN'S
L.J. 61, 74 (2003) (quoting ANGELA RODDEY HOLDER, LEGAL ISSUES IN PEDIATRICS AND
ADOLESCENT MEDICINE 129 (2d ed. 1985)).
98. Id.
99. Id. at 75.
100. Ehrlich, supra note 97, at 75.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 76.
104. Ehrlich, supra note 97, at 75.
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makers, and that minors are incapable of meaningful self-definition.' 10 5
More closely related to the issue at hand, whether a mature minor may
participate in health care decisions, are exceptions to parental autonomy
that are directly linked to medical care. First, a physician does not have to
seek a parent's permission before providing emergency medical health care
to a minor.'0 6 The policy behind this exception is complex.'
0 7
The medical emergency exception operates under an implied consent
theory, or the theory that a parent would undoubtedly authorize the
treatment if contacted, and under the idea that doctors must be able to
administer emergency care without the threat of liability. 10' Lurking within
this exception, however, is the notion that parental autonomy is not
absolute as the exception places more importance on a minor's welfare than
"the decision-making authority of parents," thereby recognizing that
children are separate human beings that cannot be at all times under the
protective wing of their parents' care and authority.' 09
Second, an exception to parental autonomy exists in the form of
medical neglect of a minor.110 In this exception, a state will intervene in a
child's health care if a parent seems unwilling to provide what the state
deems to be appropriate medical care."' This exception transfers a
parent's decision-making authority to the state, not to the minor. 12 While
the medical neglect exception does not explicitly embrace a mature minor's
right to make health care decisions, it does highlight a reality that parents
do not always make the best decisions for their children. Rather, beyond
natural bonds of affection and a child's best interests, a parent may be
influenced by a number of factors, including finances or religious beliefs.11
3
In the mental health context, the Supreme Court held that a minor
possesses due process rights if a minor is involuntarily committed by his or
her parents for mental health treatment in a state institution. 14 In Parham,
the Court held that a Georgia statute that allowed a minor to be committed
by his parents against his will without a judicial hearing was not
105. Id.
106. J. Shoshanna Ehrlich, Minors as Medical Decision Makers: The Pretextual
Reasoning of the Court in the Abortion Cases, 7 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 65, 73 (2000).
107. Id.
108. Ehrlich, supra note 106, at 73.
109. Id. at 74 (clarifying that "[w]ithout implying neglect, [the medical emergency
exception] embodies an awareness that in the ordinary course of life, parents and children




113. Id. at 75 (arguing that "[b]y capturing the very real possibility of divergent
interests, and allowing for parental displacement, this exception forces us to recognize that
not all families function as integrated and harmonious units in which the basic needs of
children are met by their parents.").
114. Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 600 (1979).
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unconstitutional. 1 5 Although the Court clearly articulated that a child "in
common with adults, has a substantial liberty interest in not being confined
unnecessarily for medical treatment," it did not determine the extent of that
liberty interest or due process right." 
6
This case remains pivotal, however, and key in the analysis of
exceptions to parental autonomy, because it acknowledges that minors are
guaranteed due process rights and may assert a substantial right of privacy
and liberty interest in the health care context against the interests and
desires of their parents. 17 The Court here establishes clear precedent that
"[t]he child's rights and the nature of the commitment decision are such
that parents cannot always have absolute and unreviewable discretion to
decide whether to have a child institutionalized."' 1 8 The Court found that a
neutral fact-finder was necessary to review the commitment decision, and
determined that due process was and may be adequately satisfied by an
admitting physician acting as that neutral fact finder.' 
9
Several state courts have further defined a child's due process rights.
The Supreme Court of California recognized in In re Roger S. the personal
liberty interest of a minor and concluded that a parent may not waive a
minor's procedural due process rights under either the California or the
United States Constitution, which entitle a minor to a determination by a
neutral fact-finder of whether 1) the minor is mentally ill, and 2) if not,
whether the minor will benefit from state hospitalization. 120  This case
reinforces that minors possess viable liberty interests, due process rights
and autonomy from a parent who may attempt to override those rights.
12 1
The California Supreme Court strongly declared that:
[t]he serious consequences attendant upon involuntary
commitment of a minor as a mentally ill or disordered
person, and the significant potential for error in diagnosis
convinces us that a minor who is mature enough to
participate intelligently in the decision to independently
assert his right to due process in the commitment decision
115. Id. at 616-17.
116. Id. at 600.
117. See id.
118. Id. at 604.
119. Kelli Schmidt, "Who are You to Say What MY Best Interest Is?" Minors' Due
Process Rights When Admitted by Parents for Inpatient Mental Health Treatment. 71 WASH.
L. REv. 1187, 1191-2 (1996) (highlighting that a number of questions were "left
unanswered by the Court. The Court did not specify any requirements for review of the
initial admission decision nor did it discuss whether Georgia's state hospitals had adequate
review procedures. Additionally the Court did not determine what due process protections
are necessary.. . to admit the minor to a private, rather than public, mental health
hospital.").
120. 569 P.2d 1286, 1289 (Cal. 1977).'
121. Id.
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must be permitted to do SO.
122
In re Roger S. sets a precedent for a minor to assert a due process right
and liberty interest in situations where a health care decision made by a
parent may have grave and drastic consequences to the minor's present and
future life. 123 In Illinois, an appellate court found that when
electroconvulsive therapy is proposed to treat a minor, a minor's liberty
interest in being free from such invasive treatment increases and must be
protected by more than the court's approval of a parent's consent to the
treatment. 124 This extra protection includes a hearing to establish if the
minor is competent to consent to electroconvulsive shock therapy, and if
not, the court must determine at the hearing, while ensuring the minor
receives due process protections, if the treatment would indeed be in the
best interests of the minor. 1
25
This exception directly questions a parent's authority to authorize
radical treatment for a minor, and thereby highlights the underlying
principle that a minor's liberty interest is of greater importance and
provides for greater protection when the degree of danger and invasiveness
of the proposed treatment increases. 126 The exceptions in the mental health
care context clearly establish that a minor possesses viable due process
rights that are at least equal to, if not greater than, a parent's parental
autonomy to involuntarily commit a minor or consent to controversial
treatments. 1
27
Perhaps the most significant exception to parental autonomy exists in
the right of a mature minor to obtain an abortion without parental consent
through a judicial bypass procedure. 28 The Court in Bellotti was unwilling
to let a parent exert potentially total control over a minor's right to make
procreative decisions. 29 After considering the implications of forcing a
minor to carry a pregnancy to term and potentially assume the tremendous
responsibilities and obligations of motherhood, the Court "reiterated that
the Constitution does not support giving a third party ultimate control over
'the decision of the physician and his patient to terminate the patient's
pregnancy, regardless of the reason for withholding the consent.""
130
The Court struck down the statute ultimately on due process grounds as
122. Roger S., 569 P.2d at 1291.
123. See In re Roger S., 569 P.2d 1286 (Cal. 1977).
124. In re A.M.P., 708 N.E.2d 1235, 1239 (Il1. App. Ct. 1999).
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. See generally id.
128. Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 647.
129. Id.
130. Ehrlich, supra note 97, at 85 (citing Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S.
52, 74 (1976)).
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it imposed an undue burden on a minor's right to seek an abortion.' 3' The
Court further provided for a mandatory judicial bypass to be included in
those statutes, which require parental consent to allow a mature minor to
petition the court for an abortion, without parental knowledge or
involvement, and to receive the procedure if the court determines that the
minor is mature enough to make an informed decision.'32  The abortion
context opened the window for a minor who may be considered to be
mature to make critical medical care decisions without parental
interference, reflecting a belief that minors may be recognized at times as
"autonomous, rights-bearing individuals with unmediated claims to legal
self-hood.'
133
Other exceptions to parental autonomy exist in the context of a minor's
right to seek and consent to health care.134 Most states have statutes that
allow minors to seek and receive treatment, without their parents' consent,
for sexually transmitted diseases and drug and alcohol abuse. 135  In
addition, the statutes also allow minors access to family planning services
and contraception, pregnancy related health care and mental health
treatment without parental permission. 1
36
In fact, minors have not only a statutory, but also a constitutional right
to obtain contraceptives as the Supreme Court extended the right of privacy
in procreation to include minors. 37 A minor may receive these basic health
care services without parental permission because it furthers the positive
state goals of promoting good public health and protecting a child's welfare
by guaranteeing that a child, who otherwise may not ask a parent for
treatment, will have unfettered access to necessary medical care. 138 Also
embedded in these statutes and a minor's constitutional right of privacy is
the idea that a minor can make sensitive, critical health care decisions
without parental involvement. 1
39
Overall, these laws recognize that a parent's wishes and beliefs often
conflict with a minor's, and those conflicts can deprive a minor of vital
medical assistance if a minor chooses to forego health care to avoid a
131. Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 647.
132. See id.
133. Ehrlich, supra note 97, at 86.
134. Id. at 77.
135. Id. at 77-8. See also In re E.G., 549 N.E.2d 322 (Ill. 1989); Commonwealth v.
Nixon, 761 A.2d 1151 (Pa. 2000).
136. Ehrlich, supra note 97, at 78.
137. Carey v. Population Serv. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 694 (1977) (The Court struck
down a ban on selling or distributing contraceptives to children under the age of sixteen,
asserting that "[s]ince the state may not impose a blanket prohibition, or even a blanket
requirement of parental consent, on the choice of a minor to terminate her pregnancy, the
constitutionality of a blanket prohibition of the distribution of contraceptives to minors is a
fortiori foreclosed.").
138. Carey, 431 U.S. at 694.
139. Ehrlich, supra note 97, at 78.
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potentially devastating clash with his or her parents. 140 In essence, each of
these exceptions to parental autonomy, in a variety of different contexts,
question the entrenched idea that parents are the best and most appropriate
decision makers in every aspect of a child's life. 14' These exceptions also
reflect a recognition of minors as persons who are guaranteed basic
constitutional rights and protections, and who may function at times as
autonomous decision-makers in society.
142
C. MATURE MINORS CAN PARTICIPATE IN HEALTH CARE DECISIONS
The exceptions work to both limit parental autonomy and shift
decision-making authority to children. 143 The rationales behind each of the
exceptions clearly support creating an exception to provide a mature minor
a right under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to
participate in health care decisions.
The exceptions to parental autonomy that allow a physician to render
emergency medical care without parental consent, and that permit a state to
administer medical treatment in the event it determines a parent is not
providing a minor with adequate health care, both attest to the fact that
parental autonomy must not, and in fact cannot, be absolute. 144 Rather, the
exceptions establish that parental autonomy must be sacrificed for more
pressing, immediate interests.
145
The exceptions also recognize that children exist as separate human
beings in the world, not as mere appendages to their parents, and as such
parents cannot possibly be with their children at every moment to protect
them and make important decisions for them.146 Finally, in the cases of
medical neglect, the exception to parental autonomy which allows a state to
provide medical care to a child against the wishes of the parents,
demonstrates that, despite traditional reasoning, parents, though well
intentioned, may not always promote the best interests of their children. 147
In fact, "it [the exception] directly challenges the presumption that parents
always make good medical decisions for their children.'
148
Therefore, when carving out an exception for mature minors to actively
participate in medical decision-making, it may be argued that the exception
exists because of the recognition that parental autonomy is not absolute and
has not always proved to be the best way to promote a child's health and




143. See generally id.
144. Ehrlich, supra note 97, at 73.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 74.
148. Id.
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health care decision.
Other exceptions that actually grant a minor decision-making authority,
such as the emancipated minor exception and the exception giving minors
the right to seek and consent to substance abuse, venereal disease
treatment, pregnancy health care and mental health care without parental
permission, highlight the fact that minors are capable of making valid
decisions.1 49 Most importantly, these exceptions, by allowing minors to
make some critical health decisions without parental consent, give credence
to the belief that parents and minors at times have opposite interests and
wishes. Without an exception to parental autonomy, those differences "can
interfere with the provision of essential medical care."'
' 50
As such, it may be argued that an exception that allows mature minors
to participate in health care decisions should be created as a mature minor
can make independent, appropriate decisions. A precedent also exists, in
these exceptions, to give a mature minor the opportunity to participate in
critical health care decisions to lessen the impact on the minor of being
subjected to the possibly contrary wishes of the parents or the state.
The mature minor doctrine, developed in the abortion context, also
creates an important exception to parental autonomy that may be applied to
permit a minor to have a recognized voice in health care decisions."' 1 This
rule allows a minor who is mature and has the capacity to seek and consent
to an abortion.152 This exception is the first to explicitly recognize that
minors often have the ability and competence to make their own medical
care decisions.153 The implications for this rule in creating an additional
exception for a minor's voice to be heard in general health care decision-
making are vast. 154  This exception, although narrowly tailored to the
abortion context, recognizes that in very specific medical situations, after
thorough judicial deliberation of a minor's competency, a minor may make
a critical health care decision.
The mature minor exception challenges the firmly rooted belief that
minors universally lack the capacity to make decisions. 155 Under a modem
view of the exception, parental autonomy must shrink as a minor grows
older to "account for the increasing capacities of children as they move
through adolescence," thereby justifying that many mature minors can, and
should, have an active role in their vital health care decisions.
An exception to parental autonomy that would allow a minor to play an
essential role in health care decisions not only fits into the policies and
149. Ehrlich, supra note 97, at 76.
150. Id. at 78.




155. Ehrlich, supra note 97, at 77.
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reasoning behind the other exceptions that have already been created, but
also is implied under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, and is a natural extension of other constitutional rights that
have been granted to minors. The Supreme Court granted minors basic
constitutional protections, which do come into play in creating an exception
for a mature minor's voice in health care decisions.156 The liberty interest
that protects a minor from being committed or treated involuntarily at a
state mental health facility without a hearing by a neutral fact-finder also
should exist in the context of health care.
1 57
It may be persuasively argued that a minor has a definite liberty interest
to be free from crippling, invasive medical treatment. As some states have
recognized, if the invasive nature of a medical treatment increases, such as
administering electroconvulsive shock therapy, a minor's liberty interest
and procedural due process rights increase as well, protecting a minor from
being forced to submit to a treatment without an opportunity to speak his or
her opinion and have it seriously considered. 158 There is also a strong,
viable argument under In re Gault and Parham that a mature minor has a
procedural due process right to assert his or her opinion about a future
course of medical treatment. 159 In the event of a conflict between the
minor's wishes and the parents' or the state's, the minor's opinion should
be analyzed and weighed appropriately in the final decision by the court or
other neutral fact-finder, such as a hospital board.
60
Therefore, there should be a valid exception to parental autonomy for
minors in making health care decisions. The only key principle that
remains to be discussed is when a minor's due process right to participate
in health care decisions applies, and how a court should factor in that
minor's decision in the event of a parent-child-state conflict over health
care.
III. A MATURE MINOR'S VOICE
A. WHEN SHOULD IT BE HEARD?
In those rare cases where the court finds a gravely ill minor embroiled
in a conflict with his or her parents or the state, the exception to parental
autonomy that allows for a minor's voice to be heard in the health care
context is triggered. The court is then left to determine whether the minor
156. See Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 622-23; Parham v. JR., 442 U.S. 584, 584 (1979);
Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist. 393 U.S. 503, 514 (1969); In re Gault, 387
U.S. 1, 33-57 (1967).
157. Parham, 442 U.S. at 584.
158. See In re Roger S., 569 P.2d 1286, 1288 (Cal. 1977); see also In re A.M.P., 708
N.E.2d 1235, 1239 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999).
159. Parham, 442 U.S. at 584; Gault, 387 U.S. at 33-57 (both cases recognizing a
minor's autonomy and right to due process protections).
160. Parham, 442 U.S. at 584.
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is competent to utilize the exception and articulate his or her opinion.
There are several different approaches to integrating a minor's interests
into the medical decision-making process.' 61 Scholars have proposed three
different frameworks, reflected in Supreme Court cases, for incorporating
children's interests into the legal system in general. 162 The first method is
the coterminous view, in which a child's rights are as extensive as an
adult's constitutional rights.' 63 Under this perspective, a child is granted
the most autonomy and is considered a full-fledged member of society,
enjoying the same constitutional privileges and protections as adults.' 64 A
child under the coterminous view would always be given a voice, and
perhaps the determinative voice, in medical decisions.1
65
This approach is not the most ideal, however, as children, especially
very young children, cannot realistically make critical decisions, and if
"everyone enjoyed the same rights regardless of age ... children could
vote without understanding the process; they could marry without being
able to handle the responsibilities of married life; and they could choose
not to attend school without fear of reprisal.1 66
Under a separatist method, the court may invoke children's rights cases
to decide parent-child-state conflicts.1 67 This method simplifies the court's
job as it does not have to struggle to apply adult legal principles to a child's
situation. 68 Rather, this approach allows for a tremendous flexibility in
deciding children's rights cases as the court may fit the child into other
cases that match that particular child's stage of development. 69  This
approach is problematic, however, as it does not lead to developing
"consistent judicial standards." Also, in the context of allowing a mature
minor a right to participate in health care decisions, the court may swing
wildly in allowing some minors, but not others, a voice because the court
may determine that only a handful of minors fit into the required
developmental state where a minor's interests become important.
70
The integrationist view is the best approach to determining when a
mature minor has a right to participate. Under this method, a court would
apply basic legal principles to determine whether a minor may speak up in
161. Rush, supra note 18, at 487.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 488-89.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 488 (praising the coterminous view as democratic, judicially simple and
predictable because "in a given area'of children's rights law, courts can draw upon a well-
established body of law addressing the area from an adult perspective.").
166. Id.
167. Rush, supra note 18, at487.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 490 (explaining that "[t]he separatist view allows courts to respect the
child as a child and as an individual.").
170. Id
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a parent-child-state conflict. 171 First, the exceptions to parental autonomy
establish that there is room for a minor's opinion to be voiced in the
context of medical decision-making. A minor's interests in participating in
his or her health care arise when there is a conflict between the parents and
the child, the child and the state, or the parent-child and the state, over a
proposed medical treatment that is highly invasive and that carries with it
grave consequences if is approved or refused. 72 Just like involuntarily
committing a minor to a state mental health institution, as in Parham, or
approving electroconvulsive shock therapy for a minor as in In re A.MP.,
administering or refusing drastic medical treatment necessarily implicates a
minor's liberty interests and elevates those interests to the same level of
importance as parental autonomy or the interests of the state. 173 Therefore,
this Note proposes that the court should become involved in a minor's
health care and question the authority of the parents, the state, or both, only
when there is a conflict of interest in the triangle between parents, the child
and the state that involves intensive medical care to treat an extreme health
situation.
After making such a determination, the court would proceed under the
integrationist method to "compare the rights of the child to those of an
adult in a similar situation."' 74 If the court finds that there is no reason in
that situation to deny an adult the right to participate in a health care
decision, and further that there is no reason to treat the child differently
than an adult in that given situation, as in no special state interests arise in
protecting a vulnerable child's welfare, then that child should be accorded
the same right to participate in health care decision-making as would be
given to the adult. 175 "Conversely, if evidence shows that in a particular
situation the child needs to be treated differently, the state may impose a
greater restriction on the child pursuant to its police powers ... [and] the
child's rights should be modified accordingly."'
' 76
This integrationist approach is the most thorough, reasonable and fair
as it allows a court to consider a child as an individual who may be entitled
to a host of rights, and who is at least entitled to just treatment achieved by
applying standard, recognized legal principles to children's cases. 177 By
insisting on applying traditional legal principles, regardless of the minor's
age, the court will achieve consistent, predictable results in children's
rights cases.178 This approach is also flexible enough to allow the state the
171. Rush, supra note 18, at487.
172. See Parham, 442 U.S. at 628 (1979) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
173. See generally id.; see also 708 N.E.2d 1235, 1235 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999).
174. Rush, supra note 18, at 491.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 492.
178. Id. at 491.
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discretion to protect children in the event it is demonstrated that a particular
minor does not have the capacity to make an appropriate or informed
medical decision. 179  Additionally, and most importantly, this approach
requires a court to engage in a deeper analysis of children's rights cases
because it does not allow the court to rely "on a vague rationale of parens
patriae" to justify imposing a state's or parent's wishes on a child, and
"[c]onsequently, the reasoning in opinions that determine the validity of
state intervention will be more systematic, accurate, critical, and
thorough."'
180
In the particular context of medical decision-making, the integrationist
view should be triggered on a sliding scale approach. Under a sliding scale
approach, the state's interest in protecting a child from a potentially foolish
medical decision is strongest when the minor is very young, or immature,
and therefore unable to make critical decisions. 181 The state's interest
"fades, however, as the minor gets older and disappears upon [the minor]
reaching adulthood." 182  It is when the state's interest is fading on this
sliding scale that the integrationist method should be applied to determine
if a minor should be granted a right to participate in health care decisions.
Therefore, a minor's voice should be heard when the minor is fast
approaching adulthood and where it has been determined by the court,
under the integrationist method, that there is no compelling reason to treat a
child differently than an adult in that particular situation.
B. THE TRIPARTITE TEST
To determine, under the integrationist approach, whether there is a
reason to treat a minor differently than an adult, the court should apply a
comprehensive tripartite test. In the past, courts have used a variety of
methods to determine if a child should have the same rights as an adult in
medical decision-making.' 8 3 Some courts analyze whether there is reason
to treat a child differently on an ad hoc, case by case basis which is not
ideal as it leads to inconsistent results and ruins the thorough, predictable
nature of the integrationist method.
84
Other courts employ a best interests test to determine if a child should
be treated equally or differently from an adult.8 5 In the best interests test,
179. Id. at 493.
180. Id. at 492.
181. In re E.G., 549 N.E.2d 322, 327 (Ill. 1990) (proposing that a state's protective
power over minors in a medical care context should operate on a sliding scale basis,
decreasing as a minor matures).
182. Id.
183. See generally Newmark v. Williams, 588 A.2d 1108 (Del. 1991).
184. Newmark, 588 A.2d at 1114.
185. Id. at 114 (explaining that the California Court of Appeals used a best interests
test to determine if a child needed to undergo "mild" chemotherapy after having already
received intense, invasive treatment for his cancer in In re Ted B., 189 Cal. Rptr. 22, 27
(Cal. Ct. App. 1987)).
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courts often weigh "the gravity, or potential gravity, of the child's illness,
the treating physician's medical evaluation of the course of care, the risk of
the treatment and the child's expressed preferences.' 86 Whereas the best
interests test is more thorough and measured than an unstable case-by-case
analysis, it still gives the court too much discretion to consider some factors
and ignore others, and can lead a court to decide that a child should be
treated differently from an adult based on the vague reasoning that it is in
the parens patriae power of the state to do so.
The tripartite test, used in some jurisdictions, is useful in determining
whether a minor should be able to participate in health care decisions, and
it also fits snugly into the integrationist approach. 187 Under the tripartite
test, the court considers 1) the treatment's effectiveness, 2) a child's chance
of survival with or without treatment and 3) the emotional and physical
side effects of the treatment on the child.188 The court should add a fourth
element to consider a minor's competence to actually seek or refuse
treatment to further assist in determining whether a child, under the
integrationist approach, should be treated the same as an adult and
subjected to the same legal principles and rights. This tripartite test, with
an additional competency element, seems to be the most useful and
appropriate as it is clear, precise, consistent, and fits within the goals of the
integrationist method to be fair, systematic, accurate and critical.
C. APPLICATION OF THE INTEGRATIONIST METHOD AND THE TRIPARTITE
TEST TO PARKER, PATRICIA AND KEVIN'S SITUATION
1. Parker's Medical Crisis
To judge whether Parker Jensen has a right to participate in the conflict
between his parents and the State of Utah regarding the decision to subject
him to forty-nine weeks of chemotherapy, the court would first recognize
that the dilemma implicates Parker's liberty interest to be free from
invasive treatment and his right of privacy under the Due Process Clause to
make medical decisions.
89
In Parker's situation, the court finds one of those unusual cases in
which a minor suffers from a life threatening illness, Ewing's sarcoma, and
faces an extreme chemotherapy treatment that his parents do not agree
with. Therefore, the court would first find here that the exception to
parental autonomy that allows Parker to potentially voice his opinion about
the treatment is activated. The conflict in this case, and its drastic life or
death implications, raises Parker's possible voice in the treatment decision
186. Id.
187. Id. (Most notably, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts used the
tripartite test to determine if the state should interfere when parents refused chemotherapy to
treat their child's leukemia in Custody of a Minor, 379 N.E.2d 1053, 1061-62 (Mass. 1978)).
188. Id.
189. See Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 622 (1979); Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 584 (1979).
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to the same level of importance as parental autonomy, particularly if Parker
favors the treatment against the wishes of his parents. The court is now
faced with the decision of whether that exception should be honored in this
case.
Any adult in Parker's situation would possess the right to refuse or
consent to the chemotherapy. 190  This case just barely triggers the
integrationist method to determine whether Parker possesses the same right
to determine his medical care as would an adult in his situation. On the
sliding scale, 12-year-old Parker is at the fringes of adolescence, and
therefore it can be argued that the state's interest in protecting Parker as a
very young and vulnerable child has just begun to recede into the
background, eliminating the need for an extremely aggressive protective
stance on the part of the state.191  As such, under step three of the
integrationist approach, the court must proceed to adjudicate whether there
is any reason to treat Parker differently from an adult and deny or limit his
participation in the chemotherapy decision. To decide whether he should
be treated differently, the court will employ the tripartite test.
Assuming Parker would agree with his parents and refuse the
treatment, under the first prong of the tripartite test, the court would find
that it seems as though the treatment would be effective in eliminating any
chance that the cancer may recur. However, under the second prong,
Parker's chances for survival without the treatment are very good. The
chemotherapy may be overly aggressive because Parker has not exhibited
any cancer symptoms for over a year, and the original diagnosis of Ewing's
sarcoma, a very rare form of cancer, is in dispute. Additionally, under the
third prong, the physical side effects of the chemotherapy will be severe,
and Parker will suffer terrible emotional side effects undergoing treatment
that his family does not advocate and that may necessitate removing Parker
from his home if his parents do not cooperate.
Finally, the court should consider under the fourth element Parker's
competency to make such a decision. At this point, the court would
analyze Parker's maturity level in light of such competency literature as the
MacArthur Treatment Competence Study that defines competency as
possessing adequate abilities to 1) articulate a choice, 2) understand
relevant information, 3) appreciate the nature of the situation and its
consequences, and to 4) manipulate information.' 92
190. See Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599-600 (1977) (holding that the right of
privacy encompasses the right to independently and autonomously make "certain kinds of
important decisions"); Superintendent of Belchertown State Sch. v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d
417, 424 (Mass. 1977) (reinforcing that a patient may refuse invasive treatment under the
right of privacy).
191. In re E.G., 549 N.E.2d 322, 327 (Ill. 1990).
192. Ronald Roesch, Stephen D. Hart, Patricia A. Zapf, Conceptualizing and
Assessing Competency to Stand Trial: Implications and Applications of the MacArthur
Treatment Competence Model, 2 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 96 (1996).
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The court may find Parker to be competent, which is difficult, but not
impossible, to establish in this case, given Parker's young age. Even if
Parker's competence is questionable under the fourth element of the
tripartite test, the other tripartite factors lean heavily in his favor as his
chances of survival without the chemotherapy are very good, and as the
physical and emotional effects of the treatment would be devastating. As
such, the tripartite test suggests that there is not a persuasive reason to treat
Parker differently from a similarly situated adult, but rather Parker should
be given the opportunity under the exception to parental autonomy to
participate in, if not determine, the decision to consent to or refuse the
chemotherapy. The court should respect Parker's decision, even if he
decides not to undergo chemotherapy.
If, however, Parker's chances of survival were very low without the
chemotherapy regimen, as some doctors argue, then the court may find that
the tripartite test leads to a greater state interest in protecting Parker from
making a hasty decision given that Parker's capacity and prognosis may be
questionable. In that situation, a court may order the chemotherapy over
Parker's and his parents' wishes.
If Parker were to voice a determinative opinion in this case against the
treatment, in agreement with his parents, then allowing his voice to be
heard under this decisional analysis would greatly help the court resolve the
parent-child-state conflict by tipping the scale in favor of respecting Parker
and his parents. Under any variation of the facts, the tripartite test,
combined with the integrationist approach, provides clear, consistent
guidelines for the court to reach a reasonable, critical decision in this case.
2. Patricia's Desperate Medical Need
Similar to Parker's case, the conflict between parent, child and state
over amputating Patricia's enlarged left arm implicates her due process
right of privacy to make medical decisions.1 93 First, the court would
acknowledge that a clear exception to parental autonomy exists in this case
as the proposed medical treatment is extremely serious and contentious
between Patricia, her parents and the state. Second, the state's interest in
protecting Patricia is just beginning to lessen on the sliding scale as Patricia
is fast approaching her early teenage years in which minors are more likely
to be recognized as capable decision makers. The court should then apply
the integrationist method to determine if Patricia may indeed take
advantage of the exception to parental autonomy in this case. The conflict
is aggravated here because Patricia, unlike Parker, has repeatedly requested
the operation with tears and desperation.1 94  Under the integrationist
method, an adult in Patricia's situation would possess the right to undergo
193. See Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 622.
194. In re Hudson. 126 P.2d at 768.
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the operation.
The same tripartite test would be applied in Patricia's situation as in
Parker's to determine whether Patricia should be treated the same or
differently from an adult. Under the tripartite test, the court may find that
1) the amputation would cure the problems that the enlarged arm is
causing, such as heart strain, frail health, and deformities of the spine and
chest, 2) that Patricia has very good chances of surviving the operation,
which is recommended by several physicians and 3) that the emotional and
physical side effects of amputating her left arm may be minimal to quite
positive as Patricia's mental attitude and physical health would most likely
improve significantly.
Finally, the court would consider Patricia's competence. If Patricia is
found to be competent, then there is no reason under the integrationist
method to deny Patricia an adult's right to consent to the operation, as the
procedure would 1) greatly benefit her, 2) both Patricia and her physicians
desire it and 3) her chances of survival are extremely good. Even if
Patricia is not found to be adequately competent, the other three prongs of
the tripartite test present compelling arguments that the surgery is
necessary and that the state's intervention is only minimally necessary
since the operation Patricia wants, over the desires of her parents, poses
significant benefits, not risks.
If amputating Patricia's arm turned out to have negative results and
pose more of a hardship on Patricia then her original condition did,
allowing Patricia to assert her voice in the parent-child-state conflict may
actually help her, and other minors like her, to more effectively cope as
opposed to other minors who are not involved in the decision-making
process and who may feel out of control of their lives as a result.
If the facts were different and Patricia refused the operation, which
seems to be clearly beneficial under the tripartite test, the court may step in
and intervene in her decision, preventing her from exercising the rights of
an adult, as the tripartite test points to the facts that the procedure is
desirable, and Patricia may not be mature enough to make an appropriate
decision. This would activate the state's legitimate interest in treating the
child differently in this situation.
The court in this case did allow physicians to perform the amputation,
but how the court reached its decision remains shrouded in mystery, and it
is uncertain whether the court gave any consideration to Patricia's opinion.
Certainly the decision did not establish a workable test that could be
followed by other courts. Therefore, the decisional tree utilized in this
Note is critical in this case because it allows a court to move away from
reaching decisions based on individual, subjective notions of fairness.
Rather, a court may now thoroughly analyze the facts of each case and
reach a decision based on concrete factors that other courts can apply to
reach consistent, reliable decisions in this area of the law.
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3. Kevin's Condition
Kevin's situation parallels Patricia's as the surgery to remove Kevin's
facial deformity would have very positive consequences and few side
effects. 195 Again, the court would first recognize that there is clearly an
exception to parental autonomy here to allow Kevin to participate in the
decision-making process as there is an extreme medical situation and an
aggressive conflict between Kevin, his parents and the state over how to
treat it. Kevin is different from both Parker and Patricia in that, at the age
of fifteen, the sliding scale distinctly activates the integrationist method as
all of the state's protective interests are fading as Kevin quickly approaches
the age of majority.
Under the integrationist method, an adult would have a due process
right to seek and consent to the facial surgery. Therefore, applying the
tripartite test to Kevin's situation to determine if Kevin should be treated
the same as an adult, the court would find under the test that 1) the surgery
would eliminate most of the deformity, that 2) the surgery would be very
effective and 3) the surgery would allow Kevin to develop socially and
emotionally before his situation worsens. Also, under the fourth element of
the tripartite test, it may be much easier to determine Kevin's maturity and
competency given his greater age.
Since the surgery would create significant improvements to Kevin's
emotional and physical well-being and is recommended by physicians, and
since Kevin is most likely competent to make the decision, the court should
activate the exception to parental autonomy and grant Kevin the right of an
adult to choose to have the facial deformity removed against the express
wishes of his parents. Although the surgery may pose some bleeding risks
under the second prong of the tripartite test, the benefits of the operation
and Kevin's competency indicate that there is not sufficient reason to treat
Kevin differently from an adult and hold the state's protective powers and
parental autonomy as more important over Kevin's due process liberty
interest.
If physicians and Kevin's parents wanted the surgery, and yet Kevin
refused for religious or other reasons, this decisional tree demonstrates the
extent of Kevin's liberty interest to determine his own health care. It may
be persuasively argued under this analysis that the exception to parental
autonomy would hold and Kevin would be allowed to refuse the treatment.
Kevin's competence and the diminishing state interest in his welfare would
arguably outweigh any beneficial effects of the surgery, thereby allowing
him to refuse the surgery.
195. In re Sampson, 317 N.Y.S.2d at 644.
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IV. CONCLUSION
Rather than subject mature, capable minors to the whims of parents or
the state, this Note argues that there are situations in which a minor has a
valid liberty interest under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment to play an active role in deciding his or her medical care. This
liberty interest has equal, if not sometimes greater, importance than
parental autonomy or a state's interests, and it should be heeded by the
courts.
This Note proposes a litmus test for determining when a child can, and
should, exercise his or her liberty interest to participate in the medical
decision-making process. Over several decades of adjudication, absolute
parental autonomy has been whittled down to create exceptions for minors
to act autonomously in certain circumstances. These exceptions have
created potential space for an exception for minors to make health care
decisions.
The general health care exception to parental autonomy applies to
situations in which there is a conflict of interest between parents, a
seriously ill child and/or the state over a drastic, invasive proposed course
of treatment. In these cases, the decisional tree set forth in this Note is
triggered to guide the court in analyzing 1) under a sliding scale approach,
whether the child is old enough to warrant a consideration of his or her due
process liberty interests, and if so, 2) whether there is any reason to deny
that child's potential liberty interests. To determine if the child's interest to
consent to or refuse treatment should be different from an adult's right to
choose, the court considers under a tripartite test 1) the treatment's
effectiveness, 2) a child's chance of survival with or without treatment, 3)
the emotional and physical side effects of the treatment on the child, and
finally the minor's capacity to make appropriate decisions. Under the
capacity analysis, the court should resort to adolescent psychological
competency literature, such as the MacArthur Treatment Competency
Study, to make a determination regarding the minor's maturity. This
decisional tree is clear, precise and gives the court a road map for
consistently charting when a minor's liberty interest outweighs the notions
of parental autonomy and the state's protective parens patrie power.
Unfortunately, parents and the state sometimes clash over the type of
health care that may be necessary for a gravely ill child. Too often these
disputes become bitter battles that pit parental autonomy against the state's
interests, resulting ultimately in unpredictable decisions marked by either
deference to, or a complete disregard for, a parent's wishes. Lost in these
conflicts is the child's interest in participating in health care decisions that
have life or death implications. Ideally, an alternative dispute resolution
method, such as mediation, should be employed to foster communication
between parents, their children and the state to reach a peaceful decision
that respects the different interests involved in a minor's medical care. If
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such mediation fails, however, this Note highlights the necessity of
recognizing a minor's interest in participating in the medical decisions and
proposes a thorough decisional tree that will assist the courts in
determining when it is appropriate to recognize and uphold a minor's
liberty interest under the Fourteenth Amendment to choose a course of
treatment.
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